The long speak: After decades of enmity, a shared abhorrence of Iran and a mutual fondness for Trump is delivering Israels secret links with Gulf kingdoms out into the open

In mid-February 2019, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, operated to Warsaw for a highly unusual meeting. Under the auspices of the US vice-president, Mike Pence, he encountered the ministers for foreign affairs of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and two other Gulf states that have no diplomatic ties with Israel. The major items on the agenda was containing Iran. No Palestinians represented here. Most of the existing links between Israel and the Gulf have been preserved secret- but these talks were not. In knowledge, Netanyahu’s office leaked a video of a closed session, flustering the Arab participants.

The meeting publicly showcased the remarkable knowledge that Israel, as Netanyahu was so lament to advertise, is winning following of a kind from the wealthiest the nations of the Arab world- even as the prospects for resolving the longstanding Palestinian question are at an all-time low-spirited. This unprecedented rapprochement has been driven mainly by a shared rancour towards Iran, and by the disorderly new programs of Donald Trump.

Hostility to Israel has been a characterizing aspect of the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East since Israel’s creation in 1948 and the expulsion or flight of more than 700,000 Palestinians- which Arabs bawl the Nakba, or catastrophe- that accompanied it. Still, over its first year, pan-Arab solidarity and boycott of the “Zionist entity” have largely faded away. The last-place Arab-Israeli war was in 1973. Israel’s peace conventions with Egypt and Jordan are unpopular, but have lasted decades. The 1993 Oslo agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation( PLO) was an historic- if eventually disappointing- achievement. And what is happening now with the Gulf nations is a hugely important shift.

Evidence is attaching of increasingly close ties between Israel and five of the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council( GCC)- nothing of which have formal its relationship with the Jewish state. Trump highlighted this accelerating change on his firstly foreign trip as chairman– to the Saudi capital Riyadh- by piloting on directly afterwards to Tel Aviv. Hopes for Saudi help with his much-hyped” cope of the century” to intent the Israel-Palestine conflict have faded since then. Yet Netanyahu is seeking to normalise the relationship with Saudi Arabia. And there has even been speculation about a public find between him and Mohammed bin Salman( MBS ), the Saudi crown prince who was widely blamed for the merciless murder of columnist Jamal Khashoggi last-place October. That would be a sensational- and highly controversial- time, which is why Saudis are signalling madly “that its not” going to happen. Still, the has met with Netanyahu in Warsaw moved well beyond anything that has taken place before. The abnormal is go normal.

The original impetus for these developing relationships between Israel and the Gulf positions was a reciprocal distaste for Barack Obama. In the early years of the Arab springtime, he riled the Saudis and the UAE, and fright Israel, by abandoning Egypt’s president Hosni Mubarak, and then expressed support for the popular mutiny in Syria and “ve called for” Bashar al-Assad to resign. In 2015, when the US-led nuclear agreement was signed with Iran, it was vehemently was rejected by Israel and most Gulf districts. That September, Russia’s military intervention in Syria marked the beginning of the end of the crisis for Assad. Tehran’s steadfast support for its ally in Damascus, and its backing of Hezbollah in Lebanon- Iran’s” axis of opposition”- was involved with identical hatred in Jerusalem, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

” The Obama administration was disliked by Saudi Arabia and Israel because it shunned them both ,” a elderly Saudi told me. A veteran Israeli official drawn the same disagreement:” There was a sense that we were looking at an American’ s administration that wasn’t as had undertaken to America’s traditional pals. We had to prepare common campaign because there was a sense of being left to fend for ourselves. Unwittingly, Obama lent very significantly to the buildup of relations between us and the UAE and the Saudis .”

Netanyahu’s game plan is to promote relations with the Gulf and beyond, and thus to marginalise and pressure the Palestinians.” What happens with Arab positions has never happened in our history, even when we signed peace deal ,” is his carefully smoothed formula.” Cooperation in different ways and at different levels isn’t inevitably visible above the surface, but what is below the surface is far greater than at any other span .” As Dore Gold, Netanyahu’s former national protection consultant, developed with a smile, these texts are” very carefully drafted to give a positive content without shedding the beans .”

The priority for the Saudis and their allies is fighting Iran, which in the past few years has consolidated its position in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, where it backs the Houthi rebels. MBS notoriously described Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, as a” brand-new Hitler “. Netanyahu compared Obama’s nuclear bargain to the Munich agreement of 1938- and after Trump vacated it last-place summer, Netanyahu signalled Israel’s readiness to join an” international alignment” against Tehran.” We were raised to see Israel as an adversary that occupied Arab countries ,” bickers an Emirati analyst.” The actuality now is that the Israelis are there whether you like it or not. We have common interests with them- and it’s about Iran, about stakes , not passions .”

There is also a pragmatic identification in Gulf capitals of the benefits of security, technological and economic links with an unassailably strong Israel- is not merely for their own sake, but likewise because of the US approval that fetches. Israel pictures ties with the Gulf as an important behavior of demonstrating its own force in Washington.” It can doubt that the scope of( US) aid to Arab countries could have been sustained without the backing of Aipac( the central pro-Israel hallway radical) and Jewish organisations ,” hints Eran Lerman, former deputy head of Israel’s National Security Council.

None of this means that the Palestinian issue has gone away. “Normalisation”( of relations with Israel) is still in dirty word for millions of Arabs, which is why tyrannical Gulf governors dread favourite opposition to their brand-new cosiness with Netanyahu. Formally, every GCC state remains committed to the Arabpeaceinitiative of 2002, which provides for recognition of Israel in return for a Palestinian territory in the territories occupied in 1967, with Occupied east jerusalem as its uppercase. But even this is far more than Netanyahu will ever admitted: he will consider merely a Palestinian “state-minus”, and openly refuses to dismantle the illegal settlements that segment the West Bank into disconnected enclaves. Netanyahu’s many Israeli critics- indignant over the corruption indictments he is facing as next month’s elections approach- have deplored that he is inflating both the Iranian threat and the importance of his Gulf diplomacy, while absolutely discounting the existential crisis in Israel’s own backyard- its ongoing failure to make peace with the Palestinians.


Netanyahu’s meeting with the Saudis and Emiratis in Warsaw was not the first drastic public peek of this changing Middle east world. Last-place October, the Israeli prime minister held talks in Muscat, the capital city of Oman, with its lord, Sultan Qaboos bin Said. The following period, his Likud party colleague, the culture and sports pastor Miri Regev, was calling Abu Dhabi in the UAE, while at the same epoch Israeli players were contesting in Doha in nearby Qatar.

News of Netanyahu’s Muscat trip included video footage of his talks in the ornate Bait al-Baraka palace. The prime minister, in a off-color suit and hog-tie, was investigated exchanging pleasantries with the sultan, in a turban and traditional white dishdasha dres. The Israeli leader’s partner, Sara, was there with other members of his delegating, including an inscrutable middle-aged humanity called Yossi Cohen, head of the Mossad intelligence service.

During Regev’s stay in Abu Dhabi, where Israel’s surface judo team was participating in a tournament, she moaned on camera as Hatikvah, Israel’s national hymn( the Hebrew messages are about wanting for Zion) was played. Later she toured the princely Sheikh Zayed mosque, celebrating the UAE’s founder, a loyal follower of the Palestinian induce. These two Israeli ministerial visits to Gulf uppercases sacrificed a potent raise to the mark of stunning changes in the region’s alliances.

But as information of Netanyahu’s visit to Oman developed, there was a reminder of threats to a reaction. Six Palestinians were killed and 180 disabled by Israeli army snipers on the frontiers of the Gaza Strip, where weekly protests now challenge the blockade imposed on its national territory by Israel since 2007.

Palestinian
Palestinian demonstrators on the boundaries between Israel and the Gaza Strip, October 2018. Photograph: Mohammed Saber/ EPA

” Our[ Gulf] Arab brothers … have stabbed us in the figurehead and the back, vacating us politically while cuddling Israel ,” complained the Palestinian activist Kamel Hawwash.” Israeli flags could soon be moving in the skies of some Gulf territories, while they pressure the Palestinian leadership into accepting a’ armistice’ cope that is unacceptable .” He described” sickening images of a ray … Netanyahu- the heads of state of an autocratic apartheid commonwealth, with bucketloads of Palestinian and other Arab blood on his hands- being welcomed … by the ailing sultan of Oman .”

Netanyahu was not, in fact, the first Israeli president to call Muscat. The Labor prime minister Yitzhak Rabin congregated Qaboos in 1994, as did his heir Shimon Peres. But in the mid-1 990 s the Oslo peace process, albeit shortcoming and already stumbling, was still being pursued by Israel and Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization. It was still- just about- possible to believe in a glad resolve to the world’s most intractable conflict. Nowadays, by differ , no peace talks have been held between Israel and the PLO since 2014, when the Obama administration ultimately hurled in the towel. That is a very significant difference.

But despite these recent twinkles of publicity, hard evidence of Israeli ties with the Gulf governments is still uncommon- because they remain largely covert.

The links are most visible with the UAE, where Israel, uniquely, has an official diplomatic spirit at the headquarters of the International Renewable Energy Agency in Abu Dhabi- though both countries emphasise that they do not have bilateral relations. Avi Gabbay, captain of the opposition Labour party, held talks there last-place December. Netanyahu is thought to have met Emirati captains in Cyprus in 2015 to discuss how to tackle Iran. But secret contacts between the two countries were routine from the mid-1 990 s- some of which were recorded in the US diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks. The Emiratis” believe in Israel’s role because of their feeling of Israel’s close relationship with the US, but too due to their sense that they can count on Israel against Iran ,” an Israeli diplomat observed in 2009, adding that in general Gulf Arabs” feel Israel can work magical “.

These “below-the-surface” relations suffered a shameful setback in 2010 when a Mossad hit team assassinated the Hamas operative Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in a Dubai hotel. Mabhouh was Hamas’s arms-procurement liaison with Iran. The Emiratis censored anyone identified as Israeli from entering the country, even though they are they were roaming on a foreign passport. But it wasn’t long before discreet diplomatic and business joins resumed.” In such cases you are only keep your thoughts down and wait until it all jolts over ,” said a Swiss-based Israeli businessman. In 2013 the Israeli president, Shimon Peres, spoke from Jerusalem via satellite to 29 the ministers for foreign affairs of Arab and Muslim countries attending an Abu Dhabi conference.

The Israelis softly participated in joint military exercises with UAE personnels, both in the US and in Greece, from 2016. Last-place year UAE military personnel reportedly called an Israeli airbase to review the operations of US-made F-3 5 fighter jets, though this was denied by Israel. Clandestine cooperation is believed to include Israeli intelligence surveillance of Iran, and the sale of Israeli drones used throughout this war in Yemen.

Israel’s confederations in the Arabian Gulf

But the clearest evidence of overlapping concerns between the Gulf and Israel has come in occasional public explanations from Gulf officials. In small island developing dominion of Bahrain, where the Sunni Al Khalifa monarchy subdues a Shia majority and declarations were crushed by Saudi involvement in 2011, the of ministers for foreign affairs faced disapproval last year where reference is spoke of Israel’s right to defend itself after Iranian rockets were launched from Syria. On Arabic-language social media, foes of normalisation exploded in outrage. But in late 2017, when Trump declared the contentious decision to move the American embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Bahrain’s foreign minister tweeted:” It’s not helpful to pick a fight with the US over side issues while we together addressing the issue of clear and present danger of The Theo-Fascist Islamic republic .” Rumour has it that Bahrain’s capital, Manama, may be Netanyahu’s next GCC destination.

Qatar, the dissenter of the headland, has long reacted more independently, and more so since a coalition that includes Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt imposed a siege on Qatar in 2017, to pressure it over its support of Islamist groups and its perceived tolerance of Iran. But in the past few years Doha has played an increasingly public character in interceding between Israel and Hamas, which verifies Gaza, with Qatar’s emissary delivering suitcases substance with millions of dollars in cash to pay official payments and counteract the deepening humanitarian crisis in Gaza resulting from its siege by Israel. Qatar is criticised by the Palestinian Authority, which controls the West Bank, for legitimising Hamas, its Islamist rival.

Oman too get on seriously with the Saudis and Emiratis because it has always had friendly relations with Iran, causing speculation that Netanyahu’s trip was intended to send a message to Tehran. Omani roots conceive, nonetheless, that the sultan’s summon was about advertising his pro-Israel credentials to Washington, where Trump’s hawkish national insurance squad is suspicious of Oman’s ties to the Islamic Republic. Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif, divulged afterward that he had been cautioned in advance about Netanyahu’s trip and alleged Israel of trying to cause rifts in the Gulf.


Fear of Iran, above all, is what has brought Israel and the Gulf states together. Mistrust of Tehran dates back to the 1979 Iranian change, but it has intensified in the past two decades. The US-led attack of Iraq in 2003- which immensely increased Iran’s influence in individual regions by removing a longstanding opponent, Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-dominated regime- came a year after the exposure of a secret uranium enrichment facility revealed that Iran had not vacated its nuclear program aspirations. This sharpened the focus on the Islamic Republic’s regional ideals, including threats to Israel’s undeclared nuclear monopoly.

In 2004 King Abdullah of Jordan warned of the figure of a “Shia crescent” unfold from Damascus to Tehran via Baghdad, where Iraq’s Shia majority had been empowered by the removal of Saddam. The homicide of the Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005 implicated Syria and the Iranian-backed Shia organisation Hezbollah. In January 2006, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad matched the hardline Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In December 2005, at the summit of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in Mecca, Ahmadinejad had employed a communication to disavow the Holocaust- provide a description of one commentator as” a blatant act of one-upmanship that left the Al Saud[ Saudi Arabia’s regulating kinfolk] humbled and unable to respond “.

The key turning point was the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. The 34 -day conflict observed a step-change in regional dynamics. Riyadh denounced Hezbollah’s incursion into Israel and abduction of two Israeli soldiers, describing him not as” legitimate defiance” but a” overestimated undertaking “. The Saudis and Israelis had a” common interest in coping Hezbollah and Iran a serious punch ,” echoed Daniel Kurtzer, who had been US ambassador to Israel until the previous year. Officially sanctioned Saudi clergymen excoriated Hezbollah, while opponents of Saudi Arabia’s sovereigns” grabbed upon the conflict to foreground the careful, immobility, impiety and- some occurrences, illegitimacy- of the Saudi regime ,” as a subsequently study concluded. In August, Assad insulted the rulers of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan as “half-men” because of their acrimony to the Lebanese militia.

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UN peacekeepers with a billboard testifying Iran’s late commander Ayatollah Khomeini after the Israel-Hezbollah war, southern Lebanon, September 2006. Photograph: Francois Mori/ AP

Secret diplomacy between Israel and pro-western Arab regimes then intensified. In mid-September 2006, Israel’s prime minister, Ehud Olmert, travelled to the Jordanian uppercase, Amman, to convene Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the long-standing Saudi ambassador to Washington DC, known as “Bandar Bush” because of his close links to the presidential clas. Now he was national security consultant to King Abdullah. Back in Riyadh, the Saudis were fierce when news leaked of the satisfy- as a former senior Israeli intelligence official “ve told me”- and disclaimed it had has just taken place. Publicly, Olmert said only that he was ” highly affected by various moves and announcements connected with Saudi Arabia “. Nor did he refer to meeting Bandar when he published his memoir a decade subsequently.( Israel’s clandestine relations with Arab countries are still considered a national protection concern by the military censoring authorities and a ministerial committee that veterinarians publications by dishing and former officials and politicians .)

One of the key players on the Israeli side was the Mossad chief, Meir Dagan, who was ascribed with a proactive alliance-building programme with Arab and other partners, in part as a means to enable Israel’s assassinations of Iranian scientists and destruction of Tehran’s nuclear programme.” Israel and the Gulf governments were in the same craft ,” discovered David Meidan, who led Mossad’s international department.

” All of a sudden the Mossad was schooling Farsi ,” a former intellect official marvelled. It was reported around this time that a gather had been convened in the Jordanian Red Sea resort of Aqaba between Dagan, Bandar and the is chairman of Jordanian knowledge, who chose to” building and strengthening and accelerate knowledge exchanges” to cope with Iranian threats. The noticeable proximity of Dagan’s heir Yossi Cohen- nicknamed” the simulation” because of his fashionable dress- alongside Netanyahu in Muscat last October may have been intended to send a not-so-subtle signal to the Iranians about Israel’s intellect access to Gulf capitals.

One former UAE diplomat told me that the threat from Iran today had a unifying gist comparable to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which led to a previously unreasonable US armed attendance in Saudi Arabia.” If it wasn’t for the Palestinian issue ,” the ex-diplomat said,” such relationships with Israel would be very public, and it would be very welcome, because we need their military material and technology .”

Jamal al-Suwaidi, the founder of the government-backed Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, threw it more bluntly:” The Palestinian cause is no longer at the forefront of Arabs’ interests, as it used to be for long decades; it has sharply lost priority in light of these new challenges, menaces and questions that face countries of the region .” Similarly, he added, the question of Israel was not comparable to the” threats constituted … by Iran, Hezbollah and terrorist groups “.

There is still audible opposition in the Gulf over the developing reconciliation with Israel.” I am against normalisation ,” insists Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a Dubai political scientist.” I am against sagging the Palestinian question because still others capitalising on it politically. Although Palestine is not the number one issue, it is still such issues- in the heart perhaps , not so much better in the mind .” One show, nonetheless, of UAE priorities can be found in the strict position dominances imposes on media: bulletin areas affiliated with Qatar and Iran are obstructed, but Israeli websites are not.

In addition to shared contempt for Iran, the Gulf states and Israel have been brought together by a common aggression to Islamist defendants. Arabic and English-language media associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey and Qatar routinely disclose and lambast UAE links to Israel. Qatar-based al-Jazeera is an important source for these fibs, as is the Middle East Eye website in London. Emiratis respond by be remembered that the first ever Israeli mission in the Gulf was actually opened in Qatar, in the post-Oslo honeymoon of 1996.( Israeli representative offices in Qatar and Oman closed after the outbreak of the second intifada, or Palestinian uprising, in 2000, but discreet ties continued .)

Many important developments in the progressing relationship between Israel and the Gulf have gone unreported “because theres” masked by contradictory public positions- and sometimes by outright lies. In December 2008, when some 1,400 Palestinians were killed during Gaza in the Israeli military’s Operation Cast Lead, the Saudis publicly criticised Israel. Shortly afterwards, however, Riyadh appeared to accept in farther Israeli military action against Hamas, in the form of airstrikes against Iranian forearms convoys in Sudan en route to Gaza. Revealed US cables presented the Israelis mounted a diplomatic expedition to stop artilleries being delivered. When that failed, they propelled long-distance attacks across the Red Sea into Sudan in early 2009, but crucially passed prior notification to the Saudis, according to informed sources.

By then, according to the deputy head of Israel’s National Security Council,” elderly professionals in the intelligence and security arenas from Israel and the Gulf countries were collaborating “. The same informants substantiate, as has been rarely reported but always officially repudiated, that the Saudis agreed to turn a blind eye to Israeli air force flights across their territory in the event of an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, before the relevant recommendations was vacated because of Obama’s opposition in 2012.


Israeli trade with the Gulf states is currently estimated to be worth$ 1bn a year, though no official statistics are available on either side. The potential, however, is vast- in technology, especially cybersecurity, irrigation, medical renders and the diamond manufacture, among others, it is possible to up to $25 bn annually, according to a detailed new study.

Israeli entrepreneurs expending foreign passports pilot regularly to the UAE, usually on commercial-grade flights via Amman.” There is a huge amount going on ,” says the Israeli representative of a multinational company who travels to Arab countries with an EU passport.

AGT International, owned by Israeli Mati Kochavi, electronic fences and surveillance paraphernalium worth $800 m to protect UAE perimeters and oilfields. Emirati officials described this as a non-political decision motivated by national security interests. In 2014 Haaretz did headlines when it firstly recognise a strange weekly private flight from Tel Aviv, via Amman, to Dubai. Nowadays direct flights between the Gulf and Israel, though still unexplained publicly, are frequently reported on social media. Israeli businesses operate in the UAE via companies registered in Europe. Bills of lading are produced from an intermediary country, often Jordan or Cyprus.

Like the Emiratis, the Saudis have quietly engaged Israeli business, especially in the security sphere. One Israeli firm was a subcontractor on the hi-tech barrier constructed from 2014 by the European excuse monstrous EADS along the kingdom’s perimeter with Iraq, a elderly veteran of Israel’s defence establishment revealed in an interview.

In 2012, when intruders breached the computer structure of Saudi Aramco, the national petroleum company, Israeli professions were announced in. Israel reportedly exchanged monotones to Saudi Arabia via South Africa, but denied that it had exchanged its” Iron Dome” arrangement to defend the kingdom from weapon an attack against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. In 2018 Israeli media were allowed by armed censors to report that the Israeli and Saudi chiefs of staff had met at a Washington conference for captains of US-allied legions. The Saudis repudiated the story.

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Buildings hit by Houthi rockets in Najran, Saudi Arabia, August 2016. Photograph: Reuters

Intelligence cooperation between Israel and the Gulf territories have become even more secretive- although Israeli politicians and officials do refer to it sometimes. In late 2017, Israel’s army chief of staff built headlines where reference is present to share intelligence on Iran with Saudi Arabia- noting further that their countries shared” many common interests “. Western generators support the existence of such cooperation.” The Israeli intelligence kinfolks who have gone to these countries have met the leaders ,” said a former elderly US diplomat.” They know each other quite well .” Obama’s first secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, reportedly” knew that the UAE and Saudi Arabia were … working together behind the scenes with the Mossad to counter Iranian influence “.

Unofficial Saudi spokesmen say coordinated with Israel is confined to the subjects of Iran and counter-terrorism- and complain that the Israelis inflate its range for propaganda purposes. As one well connected Saudi journalist tweeted, with usual dismissiveness:” Fetishising non-existent co-operation between #Saudi/ GCC states and #Israel has become a trend in west media/ thinktank curves .” Foreign governments close to both countries imagine the two maintain a hotline for emergencies and are in regular contact.” There is now contiguity between the Both israelis and Saudis ,” says a western ability beginning.” You has actually been the kind of security relations between countries that exist when they share a border. The committee is practical things that need to be sorted out, so you end up with a routine relation which can create more elderly contact and a most strategic outlook on both sides .”

It is a somewhat open secret. In 2013, Bandar bin Sultan, by then ranging Saudi General Intelligence, congregated the then Mossad chief, Tamir Pardo, for what a senior British beginning described as a” long and boozy dinner” at a Knightsbridge hotel.” There has never been such active cooperation between both countries, to its implementation of analysis, human knowledge and interception on Iran and actions loyal to it such as Hezbollah, the Houthis and the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Units ,” a specialist intellect newsletter reported in 2016. Saudi officials were said to be as “pleased as punch”.

On the Saudi side, however, the committee is objections that the relationship is an disproportionate one. Israel, it is said, has not ever responded to requests for intellect, even when submitted via the US. And there are indeed the indicators of an internal debate in Israel about the value of links with the empire. Its own sophisticated surveillance capabilities are not matched by what the Saudis have to offer, whether that’s knowledge of Yemeni tribes or Arabs in Iranian’s Khuzestan province, according to an Israeli with long experience of addressed with Riyadh.

There is also still a lack of trust between the two sides.” I can understand that the Israelis would not have given the Saudis sensitive information because they couldn’t be confident that the Saudis would have protected the source- and that would have created a serious counter-intelligence difficulty ,” mused another ability veteran.” They are not natural partners. They have very different intelligence cultures. The Israelis are world-class and the Gulfies are not. The Israelis would not go into a relationship unless they get some proper dividend .”


The developing linked by Israel and the Gulf were given a significant boost by Trump’s arrival in the White House- although early US plans for a join between Netanyahu, Saudi Arabia’s MBS and the Emirati crown prince, Mohammed bin Zayed, is inadequate to materialise. But the trend was already clear under Obama. Signs of increasing Saudi-Israeli relations proliferated when King Salman came to the throne in 2015, and even more so since MBS- who was profiled by Israeli intelligence on Netanyahu’s orders- was supported to crown prince.

In 2016 Israel demonstrated the go-ahead to Egypt to transfer to Saudi Arabia the Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sanafir, at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba. A Saudi lobbyist, Salman Ansari, called for a” collaborative confederation” with Israel to help MBS’s Vision 2030 blueprint for economic reform and diversification. Both countries faced” constant threats from extremist radicals … immediately supported by the totalitarian government of Iran ,” he debated. The $500 bn Neom megacity job, near the frontiers of Jordan, Egypt and Israel, allured strong Israeli attention. The Straits of Tiran, the siege of which by Egypt’s PresidentGamal Abdel Nasser prompted the 1967 campaign , now faced a brighter future, showed the commentator Abdelrahman al-Rashed,” one where armistice and prosperity dominate “.

Trump’s inflammatory decision in December 2017 to move the American embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, breaching a long-standing international consensus, initially met with a subdued response in Riyadh. The president’s” ultimate deal” to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict considered by his son-in-law Jared Kushner with MBS. Subsequent divulges pointed to a key role for the Saudis in pushing the Palestinians. And when the crown prince made a three-week trip-up to the US last spring, he gave even louder signals about his intentions toward Israel, telling the Atlantic that the Palestinians is able to accept Trump’s plan or” shut up and stop complain” about an issue that was no longer a priority compared to confronting Iran. MBS also explicitly acknowledged Jewish claims to Israel, saying:” I believe the Palestinians and the Israelis has every right to to have their own land .” Palestinian demonstrators in Gaza burned photographs of the Saudi royals.

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The crown prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman. Photo: AP

Unusually, MBS was then reined in by his father. In April 2018, at the Arab League summit in Dhahran, Salman announced that it would be called the al-Quds( Jerusalem) elevation.” In Saudi Arabia, the lord is the one who decides on this issue now , not the crown prince ,” as a elderly Arab diplomat clarified. The resumption of Saudi financial aid to the cash-strapped Palestinian Authority- which was also a have responded to Qatari support for Hamas-ruled Gaza- was another clue.

In the background, nonetheless were other signalings of Saudi flexibility: in March 2018 a commercial flight from Delhi to Tel Aviv was allowed for the first time to cross Saudi airspace. But there was a significant qualification.” Kerry requested the Saudis to let[ Israeli airline] El Al tent-fly over their territory ,” showed an Israeli security expert.” And who got dispensation? Air India! it shows that the Saudis can be flexible but they cannot betray the Palestinians , not because they desire them or trust them but because it is an issue for their people and the religious organisation- and too because of its own position vis-a-vis Iran .” Nevertheless, it fitted the narrative that Netanyahu has been eagerly helping, that relations with key Arab states were” improving beyond resource” irrespective of the Palestinian issue. In June the Saudi intelligence director Khalid bin Ali al-Humaidan apparently assembled Kushner and Trump’s envoy Jason Greenblatt, as well as the Mossad’s Yossi Cohen and his Palestinian Authority, Jordanian and Egyptian equivalents, in Aqaba to discuss regional security.

These increasingly cosy rapports suffered a serious punch with the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul in October 2018. Amid international denunciation and constantly changing Saudi responses, the Israeli government was initially silent. When Netanyahu eventually addressed the issue, he deplored a “horrendous” incident, but informed it is necessary to that Saudi Arabia remain stable- which was more or less exactly what Trump said, very. Saudi roots said his position was ” much appreciated” in Riyadh. Israel’s intelligence community was said to be alarmed by MBS’s recklessness.” Let’s hope that if he wants to assassinate beings again- say officers of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards- he’ll consult parties with some relevant know ,” wrote the security expert Ronen Bergman. Surveillance equipment manufactured by the Israeli company NSO was supposedly been applied to track the Saudi journalist, according to the Washington Post. And one of the two top aides to MBS who were blamed for the killing was “the worlds biggest” Saudi official to have visited Israel( in search of state-of-the-art surveillance technology ), reported the Wall Street Journal. It revealed too that new arrangements had been put in place to allow Israel entrepreneurs to softly visit the kingdom.

In public, however, Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Israel remains cautious and reticent. Unlike the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar, it to refuse Israelis to attend international sports events.” Not hosting a chess tournament with Israeli participants is a statement of our resolving for a free Palestine ,” commented the correspondent Tariq al-Maeena.” As the Custodian of the two Holy Mosques, Saudi Arabia tolerates the load of the Muslim world and these sorts of commitment is needed for fend off splendid Zionist intends for the region .” Last-place December the Saudis even resisted a UN resolution decry Hamas, along with all other Arab states.

Among the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah, fear appeared to have subsided. Hypothesi about how far MBS will dare to go in espousing Israel is no more than” gossipy insinuation”, said the Palestinian ambassador in London, Husam Zomlot, who was thrown out of Washington as one of the purposes of the US offensive against the PLO. Saeb Erekat, the PLO’s premier negotiator, despised the” imperialist fantasies of the Trump unit”, insisting that” all of the members of Palestine remains close in the heart of every Arab- and is not going to fade away “.

Netanyahu is protruding to his dialogue: inspect Chad in January, he boasted that Israel’s relations with that country had been renewed in the face of Iranian and Palestinian opposition, and that it was the result of improving links with the Arab world. But on the eve of the Warsaw conference, a leaked Israeli foreign ministry report assessed that the Saudis were not prepared to go further in developing overt relations. The same degree was made by the Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal, another ex-spymaster.” Israeli public opinion should not be cheated into believing that the Palestinian issue is a dead concern ,” he said in an extraordinary interview with an Israeli TV channel.

The attitudes of Gulf governments have clearly changed. But the bottom line is that Israel has failed to provide the incentives required for the Saudis and their allies to come out of the wardrobe, to allow them to reconcile geopolitical reasoning with popular sentiment, because it has not offered anything approaching an acceptable deal for the Palestinians.” Everyone are all aware of the rapprochement with Israel, but no one can talk about it publicly, and no one can advocate it because there is nothing for the Palestinians in return ,” concludes an Arab commentator in Abu Dhabi.” The belief is that if it was going to happen openly, it would have to be in return for something large-hearted, and it does not look as though that is going to happen .”

Many Israelis agree. Even the ex-Mossad chairman Pardo argues that the cosiest clandestine connec

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